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Introduction
This paper debates issues concerning the or-
ganization of work and production in the current 
context of capitalism, mainly work management, 
labor process and its implications on the regulation 
of labor. It aims to discuss the thesis according to 
which capitalist societies have been through a sharp 
shift in the nature of work relations, assuming that 
social and economic changes in work management 
and new technologies would have dissolved tradi-
tional forms of employment. Using the idea that 
self-employment, new forms of work or the precar-
iat is growing, there is a relative consensus among 
many authors and institutions that the decline of 
wage labor is a feature or a trend of contemporary 
labor markets. This perspective has had an enor-
mous repercussion on labor studies in the last de-
cades and has increasingly affected the regulation of 
labor around the globe. 
We do not deny the emergence of changes in 
labor management by companies. However, we 
strongly disagree that these modifications have im-
plied the reduction of wage labor or have made labor 
law unfeasible. To sustain and develop these central 
ideas, the main arguments presented here are:
1. Despite many claims to the contrary, wage 
work has grown all over the world according 
to aggregated data covering the last decades. 
Even in countries in which self-employment 
has increased in the last few years, there is 
no sustainable indicator showing a decline in 
wage work.
2. The majority of the so-called new forms of 
work are strategies adopted by companies to 
manage wage work, increasing flexibility (and 
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precariousness) by denying the employment 
relation itself.
3. The growth or decline of real or disguised self-
employment is strongly linked to labor market 
performance and social regulation of labor.  
4. The narrative we call the new “farewell to the 
working class”, whether deliberately or unin-
tended, has helped the strategy of capital to 
increase its power by making labor more pre-
carious and workers less likely to confront ex-
ploitation. This is so because the thesis of the 
spread of new forms of work contributes to 
legitimize precarious forms of contracting and 
managing labor by presenting them as inexo-
rable.  
This paper shows some examples of how these 
supposed new work forms are in fact a strategy of 
capital to impose different ways of hiring workers1. 
One of the main capitalist procedures has been not 
to present themselves as employers, calling these 
workers by other names, such as “independent” 
producers, “partners”, etc., or saying that compa-
nies are now organized upon “new ways of work”, 
instead of hiring employees. Actually, this process 
has undermined chances of limiting labor exploita-
tion, thus seeking many facilitations for accumula-
tion, such as making collective actions less likely to 
occur, impairing labor rights, increasing manage-
ment flexibility etc. 
This process also encourages (and is encour-
aged by) the idea that class structure has changed, 
enabling the strengthening of debates over the so-
called precariat, in one view, or the “grey zone” 
in the labor market, in another. Although these 
perspectives are politically different, they both 
claim that wage labor has been reduced, replaced 
by other types of work or even by other classes. 
Thus, in a conjuncture of a huge offensive of capi-
tal and the increasing subsumption of the work-
ing class by it, we are witnessing a new farewell to 
the working class2.
The new farewell to the working class is an 
expression inspired by Andre Gorz’s and Ricardo 
Antunes’ books, respectively “Farewell to the prole-
tariat” (1982) and “Farewell to work?” (1995). Like 
the first farewell, the current process has theoretical 
and empirical problems, but not of the same kind. 
We believe it is misleading the way in which some 
authors and institutions address the changes (or 
supposed changes) in the world of work, referring 
to both theoretical and political problems.
This paper is based on empirical data from 
around the world but focuses on the cases of the 
Brazilian and British labor markets. Although 
these countries have distinct productive structures 
and differences in their labor markets and social 
regulations, they were chosen as a way to analyze 
general trends that impact both central and pe-
ripheral countries.
We have carried out several case studies over 
some of the most famous “new forms of work” in 
order to  analyze their content and how they differ 
from traditional employment in terms of subordi-
nation to capital.
From a methodological point of view, we used 
the following resources: we present data organized 
on a global scale regarding the participation of 
wage labor in the general set of economically active 
and inactive people. Afterwards, we identify cases 
representative of “new forms of work” in different 
economic sectors in Brazil and the United King-
dom in order to describe the formats and conse-
quences of contracts in these countries. These are 
representative cases of sectors and companies that 
have achieved prominence on a global scale and are 
also indicated as likely trends for the labor market 
as a whole. Therefore, the analysis seeks to articu-
late a larger dimension of the process with the de-
scription of typical situations in which the object 
of this discussion can be analyzed in its concrete 
expression. In this sense, we prioritize the qualita-
tive description of the specific cases.
Besides this introduction, there are four sec-
tions in this paper: initially, the first and the new 
farewell to work are presented. Secondly, the em-
pirical consistency of the new farewell is tested; 
data is also used to link labor market performance 
and regulation and wage employment incidence. 
Finally, there is a brief discussion to emphasize the 
role played by literature and its political conse-
quences in terms of labor regulation. 
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The first and the new farewell to the working 
class
The first farewell to the working class
We give the name first farewell to the work-
ing class to formulations that, in the 1980s, sought 
to reposition concepts, categories and methods 
of analysis that focused on employment and la-
bor relations in capitalist societies. Addressing the 
social theory most related to the studies of labor 
relations, we have the works of André Gorz, spe-
cifically Adieux au Prolétariat (1980), Le chemins du 
Paradis, L’agonie du capital (1983) and Métamor-
phoses du travail. Quète du sens: critique de la raison 
économique (1988), and the set of texts of Claus 
Offe organized in Arbeitsgesellshaft: Strukturprob-
leme und Zukunftsperspektiven (1984).
The main approach of these works referred to 
a set of technical, organizational and value changes 
that would have rendered the conceptual models 
built in and for a “society of work” an anachronism.
Indeed, the longing for a theoretical implosion 
of these models begins much earlier. In her fore-
word to The Human Condition (1958), Hannah 
Arendt justified the need for an alternative to what 
she called the “theoretical glorification of work” 
as a form of refusal to technical and instrumental 
rationality that nullifies the capacity to construct 
meaningful intersubjective discourse in the politi-
cal sphere. The author, whose influence on André 
Gorz is remarkable, anchored her proposal in what 
she called a “threatening event”:
This is the advent of autonomation, which in a 
few decades probably will empty the factories 
and liberate mankind from its oldest and most 
natural burden, the burden of laboring and the 
bondage to necessity. (...) What we are con-
fronted with is the prospect of a society of la-
borers without labor, that is, without the only 
activity left to them. Surely, nothing could be 
worse (Arendt, 1958, p. 4-5).
It was precisely this “society of laborers with-
out labor” that seemed to take place historically in 
the last decades of the twentieth century due to the 
impact of the microelectronic revolution which, 
for Gorz (1983), “inaugurates the age of abolition 
of work” in two senses. First, the quantity of la-
bor diminishes to the point of “becoming marginal 
in most material productions and organizational 
activities”; second, the “face-to-face of the worker 
with matter” is undone, which is now transformed 
into a completely mediated way through the tech-
nique. Arendt’s prediction would be proving itself 
even more appropriate.
It is important to observe that Gorz’s theses crit-
ically referred to three theoretical traditions: Keynes-
ianism, because it would be “impossible to restore 
full employment” (1982, p.3); Marxism, in the sense 
of the collective or self-managed appropriation of 
the productive forces, as well as the desire to elimi-
nate alienation or heteronomy at work, which is im-
possible due to the impersonal character of the func-
tional power of technical production; and liberalism, 
because the solution to this situation could not be 
based on the imposition of economic rationality in 
the service sector, which seemed to compensate for 
the loss of jobs in industry. Putting aside the refusal 
of these three theoretical currents, Gorz offers a pre-
cise normative dimension of his theses, according 
to which, having a job may not be the criterion of 
social integration, that is, the only link leading to 
citizenship. Basic income policy appears as the only 
progressive trend. 
In his approach, there is a causal structure that, 
put in technical terms, operates in two main senses. 
First, as the objective basis of the argument, the 
author identifies the impossibility of constructing 
an inclusive social project based on work because 
human labor would no longer be the main source 
of all wealth (Gorz, 1982) or it would no longer be 
the main productive force (Gorz, 1989). Secondly, 
it is mainly the technique what provokes the “seg-
mentation and disintegration of the working class” 
(Gorz, 1989, p. 66).
According to Gorz, the combination of work’s 
loss of relevance in terms of wealth generation and 
the preservation of capitalist economic rationality 
results in a structural fragmentation of the work-
ing class, such as follows: a) a privileged minority 
(“aristocracy”) of protected and stable workers; b) 
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a “non-class of non-workers” whose activities are 
precarious and increasingly focused on the provi-
sion of personal services (the reconfiguration of a 
“class of servants”); and c) a mass of unemployed 
people. The political consequence of this way of 
exposing the social process leads him to consider 
that the “stable and privileged” minority of workers 
will, consciously or otherwise, make alliances with 
employers and dissociate themselves from what 
would be their “contrary”, i.e. precarious workers 
(1988, 66-68).
Claus Offe, in turn, faces the question of 
whether, given the totality of these transforma-
tions, the loss of objective importance of work was 
matched by the loss of subjective relevance in the 
sense of constructions of identities and expecta-
tions for the future. According to Offe, it would, 
therefore, be possible to speak of the loss of the 
centrality of work or “the crisis of the labor soci-
ety to the extent that accumulating evidence that 
shows formal paid-work has lost its subjective qual-
ity as the organizing center of human activities, 
self-esteem and social references, as well as moral 
orientations” (1989, p.7).
Using, as Gorz did, the claim that the set of 
wage earners had been deeply fragmented by techni-
cal changes, Offe points out that one of these new 
segments would be found in the form of service 
work. This is the main point for our analysis be-
cause, according to Offe (1989, pp. 22-23), service 
work would have a “distinct rationality”, qualitative-
ly different from activities in industry. That is, and 
this is the most important characteristic, a “reflective 
work” in the sense that one elaborates and maintains 
his/her own work. Two differences in relation to the 
traditional model arise. First, due to the “heteroge-
neity, discontinuity and temporal uncertainty of the 
activities ... it would not be possible to standardize a 
technical work function to be adopted as a criterion 
for controlling the execution of work”. Second, Offe 
draws attention to the inexistence of an unquestion-
able “criterion of economicity”, that is, the impos-
sibility of strategically planning “the type, volume, 
location and timing of its supply.”
The repercussions of this debate in the aca-
demic field of labor studies relations were exten-
sive3. In the Brazilian debate, Antunes (1995) elab-
orated a critique of the “farewell to work” which, 
among other arguments, highlighted two limits to 
this theoretical position. The first was the Eurocen-
tric character of the diagnostics carried out by the 
authors, as the globalization of the capitalist pro-
ductive circuit re-created millions of typically-in-
dustrial jobs in other regions of the world. Second, 
Antunes argued that the industrial and services 
sector have more similarities than differences, even 
in Europe. Indeed, the neoliberal offensive on the 
regulation of employment encourages forms of em-
ployment distinct from the Fordist pattern, but this 
did not imply a qualitative and quantitative reduc-
tion in the existence of wage-earning groups whose 
lives were subsumed by capitalist logic.
It is important to observe that our critical ap-
proach to the first farewell to work and the working 
class does not mean disregarding the magnitude of 
the phenomena that were the object of this discus-
sion. There was a marked shift in the occupational 
structure in several central countries and a grow-
ing part of the workforce was embedded in flexible 
forms of hiring. The picture was even more potent 
in the case of countries with dependent capitalism 
that already had informality or precariousness as 
the main feature of their labor markets.
But the point that seems most decisive is that 
this farewell to work was informed by a diagnosis 
of the situation which gave technological change a 
prominent and unavoidable role. Thus, a causal re-
lationship was established between what would be 
the loss of relevance of labor as a source of wealth 
- or even the supposed difficulty of measuring some 
economic activities - and the difficulty of recon-
structing stable patterns of employment regulation. 
The determination was presented as more technical 
than political and social. It is precisely this point 
that constitutes the link between the first and what 
we describe here as the new farewell to work.
The new farewell to the working class
We call a new farewell to the working class a 
set of theoretical and analytical interventions that, 
despite their political heterogeneity, radicalized the 
premises formulated in the first theses of the 1980s. 
The distinctive feature of this argumentation is the 
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emphasis given to what would be a structural de-
cline in wage labor and the impossibility of rebuild-
ing patterns of employment regulation by means of 
legal provisions. In other words, as if the so-called 
new forms of work organization were phenomena 
determined by technical imposition and not as a 
result of political disputes.
On the one hand, a noteworthy change in 
this new argument is that, unlike the first one, the 
notion of an end to work in general, as stated by 
Gorz, is less explicit. Furthermore, the current one 
stresses that not only industrial labor, but all wage 
labor would be in decline in the face of the rise of 
“new forms” of work organization. What is in ques-
tion is the impossibility of recovering or construct-
ing employment regulation patterns based on the 
notion of an employer and an employee. On the 
other hand, the basis for these assessments, as in 
the first farewell, is the prominence of the technical 
determination of social relations to the detriment 
of the political and economic strategies that affect 
the regulation of employment.
The new farewell to the working class comes 
from different perspectives but is based on similar 
assumptions and reaches similar conclusions: a) 
wage employment is declining and b) new features 
of labor markets prevent labor regulation via regu-
lar labor law.
There are at least three different approaches 
joining the new farewell to the working class. The 
more radical one assumes that self-employment is 
increasing and there is a trend to replace wage em-
ployment in labor markets. The second approach 
states that new forms of work are growing, which 
neither fit in with wage work nor with self-employ-
ment, constituting what is called a “grey area” or 
“third way of working”. The third one is presented 
by Guy Standing (2011, 2014, 2016), and is sum-
marized by his concept of “precariat”, a new social 
class that would be growing while the salaried and 
the proletariat would be shrinking worldwide. 
The first two approaches are normally com-
bined as an argument to emphasize the shift on 
labor markets. They appear, for example, in an 
International Labour Organization (ILO) publica-
tion from 2015, suggestively called “the changing 
nature of jobs”: 
In a number of advanced economies, the in-
cidence of wage and salaried employment has 
been on a downward trend, thus departing 
from historical patterns. Conversely, own-ac-
count work and other forms of employment 
outside the scope of the traditional employer–
employee arrangement are on the rise (ILO, 
2015A, p.13).
These considerations are normally based on the 
following arguments:
New technology and changes in the way en-
terprises organize production are key factors 
behind the shift in employment relationships 
and the spread of new forms of work. Achiev-
ing the standard employment model for the 
majority of workers is becoming more diffi-
cult. (ILO, 2015A, p.14)
The assumption that “new forms of work” have 
been increasing is also very relevant in underdevel-
oped countries, such as Brazil, which can be theo-
retically based on the crisis of Fordism as a pattern 
of organizing labor: 
The end of the Fordist pattern of labor - as a 
norm, which does not prevent the existence of 
work featured as Fordist - requires reflection on 
the various forms and differentiations that work 
and employment assume. These differences 
are in the origin of the “scrambling” of wage 
boundaries and the establishment of a “gray 
zone” for the new employment relations. This 
“gray zone” requires both the revision and the 
creation of new concepts within the sociology of 
work. (...) Among the emerging forms of inser-
tion through work, self-entrepreneurship stands 
out as the emblematic object of a work relation 
in substitution of an employment relationship, 
since becoming own-account entrepreneur 
means a form of distension of wage employ-
ment (Rosinfield, 2015, p. 116).4
Beyond the academic field, business interests 
are keen to pressure public regulation using the 
new farewell hypothesis. For instance, according to 
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the Financial Times: “As technology and globaliza-
tion disrupt and fragment the world of work, some 
lawyers warn legal employment statuses are too old-
fashioned to capture the complexity of many mod-
ern employment relationships” (O’connor, 2015) 
The increase of “new forms of work” and the need 
to reduce labor regulation have been strongly claimed 
by private institutions, like the National Confedera-
tion of Brazilian Industrial Employers (CNI):
The spread of information technologies has 
created a new world for work. There are knowl-
edge-intensive activities that can be developed 
by a group of people spread out around the 
country or around the world. Being special-
ized, this type of worker can match the atten-
dance to demands from different companies. 
You can work at home, without wasting time 
in traffic, determining your schedules in the 
way that suits you best. However, the modern 
working relationships of the 21st century are 
still regulated by obsolete norms of the first 
half of the 20th century (CNI, 2010, p.109).
This picture has predictably influenced public 
regulation. In 2015, the UK government published 
an Employment Status Report carried out by the 
Office of Tax Simplification. According to its Di-
rector John Whiting:
This system of two alternatives can be seen as a 
traditional view of the labor market. People ei-
ther worked, normally full-time, for an employ-
er; or they were clearly self-employed: the local 
plumber for example. But that traditional labor 
market has changed significantly in recent years: 
(…). This made sense in the 1950s and 1960s 
but the huge growth in freelancing as a way of life 
(and work) doesn’t fit readily into this traditional 
model. That growth stems from the IT industry, 
but has spread far beyond it, facilitated by the in-
ternet and (nowadays) ‘apps’. Some people may 
be forced into this form of working but more 
choose it and value the flexibility it brings. All 
of this leads some to suggest that the tax system 
needs to recognize a ‘third way’ of working.(…) 
there has been a considerable growth in people 
working on their own but taking on roles in an 
organization for a period, sometimes on an ex-
clusive basis but often whilst working elsewhere. 
These people may have no desire for traditional 
employment rights; they are often termed free-
lancers or contractors. (UK, 2015, P. 2)
This “new world of work” featured by the spread 
of new forms of work is also assumed by Guy Stand-
ing (2014, 2016). According to him, the world is 
experiencing a “Global Transformation” analogous 
to the “Great Transformation” identified by Karl 
Polanyi (1944). Today, however, a global market 
system has been built, whilst Polanyi analyzed the 
creation of national market economies. The precar-
iat emerged from this new framework, a new class 
characterized by chronic uncertainty and insecurity. 
Standing asserts that the precariat has different re-
lations of production, distribution and citizenship 
compared to the salaried and the proletariat. The 
precariat is inherently unstable, its members are al-
ways ready for an uncertain job and have no control 
over their time and depend exclusively on salary to 
survive (they have no labor rights). In short, Stand-
ing affirms that while during the Great Transforma-
tion national capital admitted a stable work for the 
core of the proletariat, today global capital imposes 
complete instability on the precariat. The author sees 
this difference as fundamental to discriminate the 
precariat from other classes.
For Standing, we are experiencing a revolution 
in forms of work that makes previous regulation un-
feasible to protect workers and reduce inequalities. 
The type of work that grows faster is what he calls 
“crowd work”, carried out by the taskers, who are 
part of the precariat and perform activities with no 
labor rights, stability or income guarantee. The task-
ers work via labor brokers, new corporations such 
as Uber. Standing considers these corporations to be 
rentiers, since they do not own the means of produc-
tion. According to the author, the taskers:
(...) are not employees, since they are not di-
rectly supervised, own the main means of pro-
duction and, in principle, have control over 
their working time. (...) They are not self-em-
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ployed either in that they depend on the labor 
broker for access to the apps. But they have to 
bear most of the risks, of accidents, ill-health, 
repairs and maintenance. They are well within 
the precariat. (Standing, 2016)
Standing states that the old system character-
istic of labor regulations is inadequate for current 
realities, defending that a universal basic income 
must be the public policy to address the precariat.
Therefore, what we are calling the new farewell 
to work, the idea that wage employment is declin-
ing and labor law is not a solution for the current 
context, seems to bring together many different 
ideological perspectives.
Our main question is: Does the new farewell 
to the working class show empirical consistency?
Empirical evidence of the new farewell to the 
working class
In this section, we are going to test the empirical 
consistency of the new farewell to the working class. 
First, we will show some available data concerning 
wage employment around the world in the last de-
cades. Then, we will briefly present some case studies 
that we have carried out in Brazil and the United 
Kingdom, inquiring about the effective content of 
these employment relations beyond what companies 
declare about them. Our main goal is to detect if 
the “new forms of work” are truly different in their 
nature from traditional employment.
Is explicit wage employment declining?
The first main indicator that seems to be for-
gotten in the debate about the recent shift in work 
relations is the proportion of wage employment 
in total employment. Despite all the claims of the 
growth of new forms of work, explicit wage and 
salaried employment has been growing around 
the world in the last decades. From 1991 to 2014, 
wage and salaried labor has increased in all conti-
nents, including developed economies, as the fol-
lowing figures taken from ILO (2015A) show. 
Even in central and south-eastern Europe, 
where wage employment fell between 1991 and 
Graphic 1
Wage and Salaried Employment (% of total employment), World and Regions 
Source: ILO, Trends Econometric Models, October 2014 (ILO, 2015, p. 28). 
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2000, the trend after this period shows the recovery 
of wage labor as a proportion of total employment. 
By 2014, wage work had surpassed half of total 
employment in the world.  
So, the so-called new forms of work, which are 
likely to be classed as self-employment, do not rep-
resent an important percentage in the most devel-
oped economies and even in Asia and Africa there 
seems to be a trend of growth of wage employment. 
In Latin America, among 18 countries between 
2005 and 2014 the proportion of wage employ-
ment raised from 61,1% to 65,1% of total employ-
ment, while self-employed oscillated from 22,9% 
to 21,9% during the same period (ILO, 2015B, p. 
42). Overall, there is no tendency of wage work de-
clining in any part of the world.
More recent available data from ILO data base 
(ILOSTAT) corroborate this growing trend of wage 
labor in total world employment, as presented below:
While employers and own-account workers 
keep stagnated on their participation rate from 2000 
to 2018, the number of employees in the world´s 
labor market increases gradually and systematically 
during the same period. It’s worth mentioning that 
this trend is also seen when considering only high-
income countries, as presented in Table 2.
In this sample of countries, probably the most 
affected by the alleged shift in work relations, self-
employment is still far from representing a threat 
to the pattern of contracts. Indeed, this type of em-
ployment faces a small reduction between 2000 and 
2018. Meanwhile, employees constitute the vast 
Table 1
WORLD: Types of Employment, Participation Rate (%) In Total Employment




2000 45,7 2,7 35,1 16,4
2001 46,0 2,8 35,0 16,2
2002 46,3 2,8 34,9 16,0
2003 46,4 2,8 34,9 15,9
2004 46,8 2,9 34,7 15,6
2005 47,3 2,9 34,5 15,3
2006 47,9 2,9 34,4 14,8
2007 48,4 2,9 34,4 14,4
2008 48,9 2,9 34,3 14,0
2009 48,9 2,9 34,5 13,7
2010 49,3 2,9 34,5 13,3
2011 49,9 2,9 34,2 13,0
2012 50,6 2,9 33,9 12,7
2013 50,9 2,9 34,0 12,3
2014 51,2 2,9 33,9 12,0
2015 51,5 2,9 34,0 11,6
2016 51,7 2,9 34,0 11,4
2017 51,9 2,9 34,1 11,1
2018 52,0 3,0 34,1 10,9
Source: elaborated from the ILOSTAT database.
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majority of total employment, experiencing a small 
increase in their participation in total employment. 
Some countries, such as Brazil and the UK, 
have been experiencing periods of growth of self-
employment, but as we will see, the process is 
neither permanent nor inexorable and depends 
on political options of labor regulation combined 
with labor market performance. In the UK, after 
considerable increase in self-employment post the 
2008 crisis, wage employment corresponds to 85% 
of total employment in the country.
Therefore, the debate over new changes in 
work relations must consider that, at least up to the 
present moment, there is no sign that new forms of 
work are replacing wage employment. 
It is worth emphasizing that the statistics pre-
sented so far come from types of contract declared 
in surveys, which means that disguised relations are 
not being taken into account. Our next step is to 
show some findings of the so-called new forms of 
work in the UK and Brazil, with the aim to point 
out the actual nature of these arrangements.
The nature of the new forms of work 
This section addresses the following questions: 
are the new forms of work truly new in terms of 
content? Or are they in fact wage employment in-
tentionally presented and claimed by companies as 
different forms of work? 
Initially it is important to stress that part of 
the statistics for self-employment exhibited in na-
Table 2
HIGH INCOME COUNTRIES: Types of Employment, Participation Rate (%) In Total Employment
Year Employees Employers Own-account workers Contributing family 
workers
2000 84,4 4,0 9,6 2,1
2001 84,5 3,9 9,6 2,0
2002 84,7 3,8 9,6 1,9
2003 84,7 3,9 9,6 1,9
2004 84,8 3,9 9,6 1,8
2005 85,0 3,8 9,5 1,7
2006 85,3 3,8 9,3 1,5
2007 85,6 3,8 9,2 1,5
2008 85,9 3,8 9,0 1,4
2009 85,9 3,8 9,1 1,3
2010 86,0 3,7 9,0 1,3
2011 86,2 3,6 9,0 1,2
2012 86,4 3,6 8,9 1,2
2013 86,6 3,5 8,8 1,1
2014 86,7 3,4 8,8 1,1
2015 86,9 3,4 8,7 1,0
2016 87,0 3,4 8,7 1,0
2017 87,1 3,3 8,6 1,0
2018 87,2 3,3 8,6 0,9
Source: elaborated from the ILOSTAT database.
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tional surveys worldwide, especially in underdevel-
oped countries, are actually independent workers 
that engage themselves in activities (normally pre-
cariously) on their own accord. Owners of small 
businesses such as barber shops, market and street 
workers, domestic maintenance (plumbers, electri-
cians, etc.), small farmers, etc., have always existed 
and will probably always exist in any capitalist soci-
ety. Thus, there is no news in these situations.
The subject approached here is the “new forms 
of work” that allegedly emerged in recent trans-
formations of capitalist societies. We chose some 
cases which we considered representative due to 
their incidence or recent increase. It is important 
to highlight that our main intention here is to now 
identify different forms of contracts by focusing on 
concrete examples.
Construction sector in the UK
The construction sector is a good example for 
analysis. It is one of the main sectors in regards 
to employing people in the UK (about 2 million 
workers)5. In the UK, the sector has one of the 
highest numbers of workers contracted by compa-
nies as self-employed. Official data indicates that 
39% of total employment in this industry is classed 
as “self-employed”. The construction sector repre-
sents about 20% of all self-employment in the UK 
(ONS, 2014). The demand for increased flexibility 
in the new capitalist context is one of the explana-
tions given to this situation.  
Companies commonly hire workers classed as 
self-employed through employment agencies or us-
ing “umbrella companies”. Despite different formal 
appearances, the cases we investigated all share a 
common factor in that the workforce continues to 
be managed by the main company. The main differ-
ence between workers (employees or self-employed) 
on the building sites is simply how they are hired.
For instance, at a building site in London that 
we visited in July 2015, similar to most sites in the 
UK according to other sources, there were 90 work-
ers. However, the main company contracted direct-
ly only 5 of them: a subcontractor hired 10 elec-
tricians, 15 were agency employees, and 60 were 
hired through agencies as self-employed. Some of 
these “self-employed” workers hired through agen-
cies had worked for years for the same company. 
The formal employees were engineers, supervisors 
and those at the top of the site hierarchy, which 
means, the ones that determine what, where, when, 
and how work should be done. To exemplify how 
the activities were organized, the crane operators, 
hired as self-employed, were forced by the compa-
ny to work ten hours a day, instead of four, which 
is the legal working day.
In 2016, the House of Commons published 
a Briefing Paper over this issue. It brought some 
information related to the use of self-employment 
by companies as a strategy to undermine labor law:
In May 2008 the Union of Construction, Al-
lied Trades & Technicians (UCATT) pub-
lished a report it had commissioned from Pro-
fessor Mark Harvey, at the University of Essex. 
The author suggested that around 30% of the 
workforce – 375,000 to 425,000 - were inac-
curately engaged as self-employed. 
(...) 
In 2007/08, the Government estimates that 
there were 300,000 subcontractors operating 
within [CIS] who did not claim any deduc-
tion for the costs of materials, nor for plant 
and equipment. These subcontractors provided 
none of the materials or plant and equipment 
which would form a substantial element of any 
contract and provided only their labor (Seely, 
2016, p. 13-14).
According to research carried out by FLEX 
(Focus on Labor Exploitation):
In the construction sector there is widespread 
use of self-employment as the preferred con-
tracting arrangement. Self-employed work-
ers have significantly fewer rights than those 
employed directly by a company. The former 
union for workers in the construction sector, 
UCATT – now merged with Unite − asserts 
that there is a direct link between these types 
of employment arrangements and exploitation, 
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and in many instances employees are not really 
working for themselves (FLEX, 2017, p. 8)
There are strong indications that the spread of 
self-employment in the British construction sector 
is strictly related to strategies to manage the work-
force, instead of some modification in the nature of 
work relations on the building sites.
Logistics: the couriers in the UK 
Another good example of the supposed new 
forms of work in the UK is the logistics workers. 
Big companies (such as large banks) use interme-
diaries to hire workers at the lowest cost and high-
est flexibility. We interviewed workers linked to 
six different intermediaries, and we also analyzed 
documents (payroll) and equipment (radios and 
control equipment)6. In this sector, practically all 
workers are formally hired as self-employed, with 
no labor rights. They are also obligated to pay fees 
to the intermediaries and have no minimum pay-
ment guarantee. Instead of having more flexibility, 
the couriers tend to work harder and rest less than 
the average worker because they have no job se-
curity and need to make an effort to compensate 
the low rate they get for each delivery. They get no 
paid holiday and no income when they are sick or 
if they suffer any work-related accident.
The situation of these couriers has even caught 
media attention. There have been reports from The 
Guardian and the BBC regarding the issue7. Some 
of the workers that we had personally interviewed 
in London were approached for these reports. For 
instance, Mario Gbobo, who fell off his bike and 
suffered a bad injury to his arm, talked to the BBC 
about the accident:
The parcel I was carrying was insured, but I 
wasn’t,” he said. “Someone came and collected 
the parcel. I had to fend for myself and ended 
up returning to work before the injury healed 
because I needed the money.
Another courier interviewed by the BBC, An-
drew Boxer, stated that:
 “I am typical,” he said. “I work for one com-
pany for around 50 hours a week. They tell me 
what to do, when to do it and how to do it. I 
am monitored, have to have company ID with 
me at all times, and can’t take work from oth-
er companies. I get paid per delivery, not per 
hour. I am required to sign a contract which 
says that I am self-employed, which means I 
don’t get any employment rights.”
The management of the workforce by the main 
companies that employ couriers is carried out by a 
kind of Dutch auction, in which the intermediary 
that offers workers for the lowest bid wins the con-
tract to provide the workforce. Although it might 
seem tricky, the so-called sharing economy, includ-
ing internet arrangements and services controlled 
by apps, has submitted workers to even more chal-
lenging conditions than traditional employment.
Sharing economy: the case of the translators
Around the globe, there has been a massive in-
crease in services offered via internet, like law ad-
visement, engineering and many others. This way 
of organizing production is known as sharing econ-
omy, platform economy, or crowd labor. Compa-
nies that own the webpage make the link between 
customers and service providers. The claim is that 
this kind of company would have customers but 
none employees. These providers would be self-
employed who allegedly command their own busi-
ness, using the webpage only as a platform to reach 
clients. However, the real picture is far from this 
superficial description.
We interviewed a translator based in London 
that works with this type of arrangement. He also 
gave us access to his emails and documents to dem-
onstrate how the labor process is organized, provid-
ing us with enough research material to draw state-
ments regarding the dynamics of this sector. To 
summarize, the company hires a pool of formally 
self-employed translators (who, in principle, may 
work for other firms). To join this pool, the trans-
lator must complete a test, submit his credentials, 
sign a contract and other documents. Once this is 
complete, every time there is a translation available, 
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the workers receive an email with a price to be ne-
gotiated. Whoever first offers a price considered sat-
isfactory by the company, wins the job. The transla-
tor explained that “it is like a speeded-up, globalized 
‘just in time’ version of what existed previously. A 
job may be worth just $10!” He goes on to specify 
how the production and labor process is carried out. 
(…) the process has become much more au-
tomated. It means that the more market share 
an agency has, the more its workers have to be 
on 24/7 alert to answer any job offer. So you 
can spend a lot of time bidding for jobs but 
not getting them (unless you cut your rates). 
Financially it is a race to the bottom.
The company selects who can be hired to form 
the pool, and then organizes the labor process via 
an auction among the workers to choose who will 
receive each job. Finally, it imposes when and how 
the translation must be done, as we can see in the 
following email:
How are you today? Hope all is well. We have 
a rush Spanish > English (US) translation 
around 1200 words we need your help with!
BACKGROUND: Clinical; INSTRUC-
TIONS: Please follow source format as closely 
as possible! Please match date format. Please 
denote any text that is illegible in brackets 
(i.e. [illegible]); Please copy/paste logos. Please 
copy/paste numbers and any English text; 
Please redact all patient information. Please in-
dicate handwriting in italics as well as a note in 
brackets i.e. [hw]. 
DELIVERABLE: One Translated Word Docu- 
ment
TRANSLATION DEADLINE:  11AM EST, 
Wednesday, 7/22. Please let us know if you are 
available for this job.
The job mentioned in this email was offered 
10:23am and had to be done by 4:00pm. As stated 
by the translator, this is a typical email sent by the 
company. For him, the meaning of the process is: 
“you must drop everything and do it now! This is 
aimed to get a maximum response (i.e. fiercest com-
petition) from us, the global pool of translators”.
This Dutch auction carried out in the shar-
ing economy is even worse than those arranged in 
other sectors because it directly involves workers 
themselves in price negotiations. Standing (2016) 
has also described this management strategy, which 
he calls a crowd labor pool: 
What happens is that platform companies con-
tract to have certain jobs done for corporations, 
and in turn designate labor requesters to con-
tract out jobs to people invited to compete in 
a Dutch auction. Requesters announce that so 
many tasks are up for bid, with a stipulated 
deadline, and that bidding will close within, say, 
five days. Often, the requester announces at the 
outset a maximum piece rate. Then taskers can 
bid to undertake as many tasks as they think 
feasible at a price they think is right. At the end, 
requesters select from the lowest bids. So, some-
body in Boston can be competing with some-
one from Bangalore or Accra. This is invidious, 
since the most insecure will tend to bid the low-
est. As they do not know how many are bidding 
or where they are, they may believe competition 
is more intense than it is. For the broker, that is 
ideal. And the tasker has no assurance he will 
be paid. If a broker, based in New York, decides 
that a tasker in Dakar did not do something 
well enough and refuses to pay, in practice the 
tasker has no means of redress.
Standing’s description shows how this mecha-
nism of hiring workers, which has become increas-
ingly common in various types of activities, oper-
ates. The profits of these companies are directly 
linked to the insecurity and precariousness of those 
who need to accept the tasks to ensure their survival. 
Our divergence from Standing’s argument is that 
the solution proposed by him - the introduction of 
a universal basic income as a way of eliminating the 
economic coercion imposed on those who must ac-
cept the tasks – considers it impossible to regulate 
these jobs through labor law. It is precisely this point 
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- the need for legal recognition of the employment 
status - at the core of the political struggle, not the 
current technical/economic picture.
Some examples from Brazil
In Brazil, many different arrangements claim 
to be new forms of work. Although many of them 
have been used for decades, they are joining the re-
cent wave of organizing labor and production pro-
cess avoiding employment status. 
For instance, there are over a million so-called 
consultants from cosmetic companies that sell 
cosmetics classed as self-employed (Abilio, 2014). 
Beauty shops allege to “rent” seats for hairdressers 
to work for them. It is common in the health sector 
to see employers hiring workers through labor co-
operatives. Companies from all sectors hire workers 
via commercial contracts as if those people were an 
enterprise of just one person. It has happened from 
the construction sector to chemical factories. In all 
these cases, despite being labelled and hired as self-
employed or even as firms, workers are submitted 
systematically, controlled by the contractor and are 
subject to the companies’ will more so than formal 
employees (Filgueiras, 2012, 2016).
One of the most common new forms of work, 
particularly in rural business, is called “integrated 
production”. In sum, the “integrated worker” is a 
small farmer that signs a contract of exclusivity to 
perform some activity that is part of a company’s 
business, for instance, planting tobacco for a ciga-
rette company.
This “integration production” is not merely 
a monopsony since the process of work and pro-
duction performed by the integrated workers is 
controlled by the so-called single buyer. Activities 
carried out by integrated workers constitute part 
of the main company’s business. The latter owns 
the products themselves (tobacco, eggs, birds, pigs, 
etc.), supplies the raw material and the inputs, im-
poses the technical standards of the activity, com-
monly finances facilities, among other things, while 
the integrated worker must attend exclusively to 
the company’s demands. The integrated worker de-
livers the production at the time and in the condi-
tions desired by the company (Filgueiras, 2013).
The integrated worker has an entirely flexible in-
come (depending exclusively on production results) 
that is divided with their families, without a guaran-
teed minimum wage, paid holiday or payment for 
overtime, even while working every day of the week. 
In a study carried out by Filgueiras (2013) in the 
poultry sector of Bahia, child labor was widespread, a 
mechanism adopted by the integrated worker to avoid 
corrosion of the already scarce family income, which 
also seems to be common in the production of tobac-
co in the southern region of Brazil (Brasil, 2007). Bla-
tant disrespect to the minimum parameters of labor 
standards was detected in egg production and broiler 
sheds, a reality that also seems to be frequent in the 
rest of the country, including cases of slave-like condi-
tions8. The “integration” arrangement is an essential 
instrument for the exercise of control and exploita-
tion of labor in these businesses. When labor law is 
completely disrespected, workers are obliged to work 
for longer hours and more intensively, rarely resting, 
working every day uninterruptedly to ensure a mini-
mum income necessary for survival (Filgueiras, 2013).
UBER
UBER is a worldwide known company that 
presents itself as an app that provides services to driv-
ers. In one instance, in a lawsuit in the UK: “Uber’s 
argument was that it was a technology company and 
that it did not provide a transport service to custom-
ers – it merely put them in touch with drivers”9.  
In Brazil, UBER drivers do not have any formal 
contract with the company, but they must follow a 
series of requirements to be admitted. Despite the 
rhetoric of working time flexibility, when UBER is 
starting its operation in a city, they attract drivers by 
making fixed payments for performing working day 
journeys. The rates paid to drivers vary by the time 
of day and the region of the city, inducing drivers to 
work according to the company’s demand. UBER 
unilaterally imposes the rates it gets from each ride, 
which also oscillate by city, season, etc. The drivers’ 
behavior must follow company guidelines, whether 
related to the customer or regarding the conditions 
of the car. All payments are made directly to UBER 
(there are exceptions, but the amount is then de-
ducted from the next rides). Drivers can not directly 
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arrange rides with customers, refuse animals, take 
another person in the vehicle, perform other services 
while they are with passengers, share the car to use 
their UBER registration, request private information 
from passengers, among several other requirements 
that must be fulfilled in the labor process. UBER 
permanently evaluates drivers through the custom-
ers, who evaluate the driver by the application at the 
end of the ride. The company makes clear that “atti-
tudes that harm the platform, users or other partners 
can also lead to deactivation” even if they are not 
pre-listed10, in other words, the worker can be dis-
missed for any reason UBER considers applicable. 
In such new forms of works, such as UBER, 
self-employed couriers, crowd labor pool and “in-
tegrated production”, companies turn the means 
of productions (vehicles, facilities, computer, land, 
etc.) into their capital without needing formal 
ownership over them, reducing investment and 
fixed capital, while at the same time pulverizing 
and transferring the risk of business to each worker, 
intensifying the spiral of pressure on the individual. 
Besides, it facilitates the legitimacy of the discourse 
of “autonomy”, “flexibility” and “entrepreneurship” 
among workers, reducing their propensity for con-
testation and collective action.
Furthermore, exclusive labor markets emerge 
from these arrangements, weakening the bargain-
ing power of workers that have to compete inside 
the company for jobs by lowering wages and work-
ing conditions. In the case of UBER and platform 
companies, they intentionally seek to form a stock 
of workers available to compete with each other, 
allowing these firms to pay meager salary. The rates 
are always varying, set per piece (ride, translation 
etc.), forging a system in which tasks available are 
driven by the logic: “who accepts the price first, 
takes the job”.
So, despite not being the formal owner of the 
means of production, companies can control the 
process of work and production through other 
means (e.g., monopolizing the interface with cus-
tomers). Not owning cars, bicycles, computers and 
small lands is a great advantage for companies, 
since they do not need to immobilize capital and 
transfer the business risks to workers, making them 
more insecure and less likely to confront orders.
A point of view, such as that of Standing, which 
emphasize that the worker owns the means of pro-
duction, highlights formality rather than the actual 
content of relations. It is worth remembering the dis-
tinction between the legal notion of ownership and 
effective power of the means of production made by 
authors such as Poulantzas (1977) and Betellheim 
(1976). In the cases discussed here, companies do not 
have formal rights to manage cars, bicycles, comput-
ers, etc. However, they have the effective possession 
of the means of production through two dimensions. 
Firstly, as we have indicated for UBER, the driver, 
the formal owner of the automobile, loses the abil-
ity to define the terms of the contract with users. He 
is the “UBER” to the person who calls him, having 
to respect a code established by the company, not a 
contractual relationship between him and the user. 
Secondly, UBER is able to control the crew of drivers 
via increasing or decreasing rates and imposing condi-
tions to guarantee the demand and supply of cars, and 
workers to perform the rides. In short, the company 
does not need legal ownership of automobiles because 
it already has its effective possession.
Besides making it harder for individual resis-
tance and collective action, these arrangements 
have undermined protective regulation of labor by 
states. The narrative that publicizes these arrange-
ments as new forms of work implies a new farewell 
to the working class, more radicalized than the first 
farewell, but based on the same core: wage employ-
ment would lose its relevance in society. Previously, 
the predictions focused on industrial labor, howev-
er, now they address wage employment as a whole. 
The world of work would be experiencing new 
ways of organizing work and production beyond 
wage work, the growth of self-employment, “grey 
areas”, undetermined relations, in any case, rela-
tions that are not suitable to labor law regulation.
It is worth emphasizing that companies have 
deliberately denied the status of wage employment 
for their workers as a critical tool to manage their 
labor and production process. By claiming their 
workers are self-employed or that these individuals 
are companies themselves, employers undermine 
workers’ conditions to impose limits to exploita-
tion, preventing them from having access to labor 
rights, dismissing them more easily, and inhibiting 
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individual or collective mobilization. Therefore, 
these workers are more precarious and even more 
submitted to companies’ orders.    
Even official documents from the UK’s Gov-
ernment stress that the use of self-employment 
status is intentionally used to undermine work-
ers’ rights and conditions, which is related to labor 
exploitation across many sectors in the country. A 
report from the Gangmasters And Labor Abuse 
Authority (GLAA, 2018), released in May 2018, 
scrutinizes this strategy in the cleaning, flower 
picking, car washing, food processing and con-
struction sectors. In Brazil, this picture is widely 
acknowledged by institutions that regulate labor 
law, although they have not been efficiently tackled 
(Filgueiras, 2012).
Participation of self-employment in total 
employment
To evaluate possibilities of labor regulation in 
the current context, it is essential to analyze the dy-
namics of types of contracts in total employment in 
two countries that have or are still experiencing the 
increase in new forms of work, most likely to be 
represented in official data as self-employed status. 
In the UK, throughout the 1980s and until 
the mid-1990s, there was a trend of growth of self-
employment (considering the sum of employers 
and own-account workers) in total employment. 
In 1995, self-employment reached 13,8% of total 
employment. However, during the subsequent pe-
riod the proportion of self-employment declined to 
11,8% in 2000:
Table 3
UK: Types of Employment, Participation Rate (%) In Total Employment




2000 87,73 3,2 8,68 0,4
2001 87,8 3,16 8,69 0,35
2002 87,69 3,05 8,93 0,34
2003 87,18 3,01 9,51 0,3
2004 86,91 3,05 9,7 0,35
2005 87,01 2,94 9,72 0,34
2006 86,77 2,93 9,97 0,33
2007 86,61 2,88 10,16 0,34
2008 86,66 2,81 10,19 0,34
2009 86,4 2,78 10,52 0,3
2010 86,01 2,65 11,02 0,32
2011 85,82 2,52 11,31 0,35
2012 85,38 2,52 11,74 0,36
2013 85,41 2,47 11,76 0,37
2014 84,77 2,54 12,32 0,38
2015 85,02 2,44 12,22 0,33
2016 84,57 2,43 12,64 0,37
2017 84,64 2,38 12,61 0,36
Source: elaborated from the ILOSTAT database.
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Even though it re-established a trend of 
growth, it took until 2012 for the proportion to 
surpass that of 1995.
The debate over the increase of self-employ-
ment has been intense. However, it is also impor-
tant to stress that between 1991 and 2014 self-em-
ployment growth represented only an extra 1,9% 
in total employment, while wage employment 
remained a massive majority of total employment 
(85%), above average in comparison to all other re-
gions of the world.
For more than two decades, the changes have 
not been substantial. Wage employment remains 
representing the vast majority of total employment, 
and oscillations in forms of engagement in the UK 
labor market indicates that there is no inexorable 
trend in any direction.
The Brazilian labor market has experienced a 
similar path. During the 1990s, the deterioration 
of the labor market was concomitant to the rise of 
self-employment. However, from the 2000s, eco-
nomic expansion was accompanied by an increase 
in wage employment for more than 10 years.
The proportion of employees in total employ-
ment raised from 54,2%, in 2002, to 61,8%, in 
2012, while self-employment fell from 22,3% to 
20,7% in the same period. Since 2012, simultane-
ously with the current economic crisis in Brazil, 
self-employment started to increase once again 
while formal wage employment has fallen.
Table 4
BRAZIL: Types of Employment, Participation Rate (%) In Total Employment




2000 62,99 4,42 26,1 6,49
2001 63,2 4,38 26,56 5,86
2002 63,06 4,41 26,7 5,83
2003 63,00 4,34 26,92 5,74
2004 63,56 4,24 26,45 5,74
2005 63,47 4,39 26,58 5,56
2006 64,26 4,61 26,19 4,94
2007 65,42 3,87 25,95 4,76
2008 66,45 4,62 24,97 3,96
2009 66,95 4,42 24,87 3,76
2010 67,84 3,95 25,03 3,19
2011 68,51 3,47 25,32 2,7
2012 70,11 3,99 22,89 3,01
2013 69,85 4,12 23,05 2,98
2014 69,97 4,12 23,16 2,75
2015 68,67 4,38 24,21 2,74
2016 68,22 4,37 25,11 2,3
2017 67,68 4,72 25,21 2,39
2018 67,75 4,73 25,16 2,37
Source: elaborated from the ILOSTAT database.
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Between 2014 and the beginning of 2016, 
self-employment has increased repeatedly. In the 
middle of 2016 it fell sharply, but from the follow-
ing quarter re-established a growth trend, reaching 
a peak of 25% in participation in the total employ-
ment in the country. The annual average of self-
employed workers increased from 20,5 million, in 
2012, to 22,7 million in 2017.
When individuals are effectively self-employed, 
they can engage either in traditional and estab-
lished forms of occupation (such as liberal profes-
sionals) or immediate survival strategies (such as 
street retailing). Besides, workers are classified as 
self-employed (the PNAD is based on the inter-
viewee’s declaration) even though they are salaried 
individuals from the most diverse activities (from 
rural work to so-called “digital platforms”) who 
work in a subordinate way in relation to the taker 
of their services, as they refuse to admit that con-
dition. An excellent example of this expansion of 
disguised self-employment is UBER. In Brazil, the 
number of drivers working for UBER multiplied 
by ten between October 2016 and October 2017, 
shifting from 50,000 to 500,000 drivers, consider-
ing only those who completed trips in the month 
of the survey (LOBEL, 2017).
These statistics help indicate that there is not 
an irresistible track to the way labor market is 
forged. Self-employment oscillates between growth 
and decline in the UK and Brazil depending on the 
economic performance and the choices made by 
private and public labor regulations. It means that 
we are dealing with a political phenomenon, associ-
ated with two questions: how capital has chosen to 
manage labor power during the neoliberal period, 
and how other forces in society have confronted or 
consented to the strategies of companies.
In Brazil, the average income of formal em-
ployees is substantially larger than informal 
employees (77%) and self-employed workers 
(33.4%). Comparing the first quarter of 2014 and 
the last quarter of 2017, only the average income 
of self-employed workers suffered a significant 
variation (a reduction of 9.2%, or R$ 159). Thus, 
while the informal employees kept their historical 
precariousness, the supposedly autonomous work-
ers saw their income getting further from those 
with a formal contract and approaching those 
without a formal contract.
Another indicator of the link between the ex-
pansion of self-employment and informal wage 
work and the precariousness of the Brazilian labor 
market in recent years appears in the number of 
contributors to Social Security. The average num-
ber of contributors in 2017 is the lowest since 
2014 (59.4 million), as well as the percentage of 
contributors among the employed (64.6% in 2014, 
against 64.1% in 2017), even with the growth of 
the occupation compared to 2016.
The fact that self-employed earnings are both 
lower and more unequally distributed than em-
ployee earnings in the UK (Office of tax simplifica-
tion, 2015) does not seem to be a coincidence. All 
indicators suggest that self-employed income has 
fallen since the beginning of the 2000s. The medi-
an income per week of the self-employed adjusted 
for inflation in 2002/03 was £290, decreasing to 
£207 in 2012/2013 (ONS, 2014). There are signs 
that this is a global trend. As stated by ILO 
In the majority of the countries self-employed 
incomes declined over the past decade, which 
could be due to the global recession and it is 
also probable that those who are laid off from 
paid employment enter self-employment de-
pressing the incomes of the self-employed 
and leading to widening of the income gap 
(2015B, p. 42).
We should add that self-employment engaged 
in new forms of work probably plays an important 
role in this process. 
Data from the UK also show that the self-
employed work more hours per week compared to 
employees (ONS, Labor Force Survey, 2014). Also, 
in 2013, the self-employed lost fewer hours to sick-
ness than employees, respectively 1.2% of working 
hours and 2.1% (LFS – ONS), corroborating our 
perception on the case studies. On average, the self-
employed have a lower income, work more hours 
per week and take less time off work. The supposed 
flexibility of the “new forms of work” seems to be 
more rigid than for wage employment. 
18 REVISTA BRASILEIRA DE CIÊNCIAS SOCIAIS - VOL. 35 N° 102
The political implication of the new farewell: 
making it seem inexorable
Despite being forged by evident wage work 
characteristics, the legal definition of the new 
forms of work is a political matter. The way it is 
defined imposes how it will be regulated and how 
people submitted to these arrangements will work 
and live. That is why we are facing essential issues 
that have already undermined people’s quality of 
life during the last decades. 
This political struggle regarding the framing of 
wage labor is as old as capitalism itself. Agreements 
and compromises that allowed limits to commodi-
fication of labor power are unstable and exposed 
to constant changes. Since the last decades of the 
twentieth century, there has been an international 
strengthening of what Dardot and Laval (2016) 
called “the new reason of the world”. The power 
of neoliberalism is not restricted to its capacity 
to carry out legal changes or privatize public ser-
vices. Since the beginning, it intends to design a 
new mentality aiming to make all individuals think 
and act as if they were companies. In this sense, it 
is crucial to deny any technical neutrality on the 
statement that “new” forms of work are not suit-
able to labor law, moreover as they are, indeed, 
wage labor.
It is important to emphasize that there is a fun-
damental difference between wage work and the 
concept of employee. The concept of employee is 
built to regulate a relation that is politically defined. 
It may embrace broader or narrower situations. For 
instance, the law may state that an employee is only 
applied to an individual who works for the same 
company over 10 hours each day, defining those 
not in this category as “freelancers”. The law is a so-
cial relation and can be defined in any way as long 
as there is political power to impose it, regardless of 
the content of regulated empirical relations. Fur-
thermore, it can define something in one direction 
today and switch to another direction tomorrow, 
depending on the political struggle related to the 
subject in dispute. 
That is precisely the case of the new forms of 
work. The companies present their labor and pro-
cess as “new” intentionally, among other reasons, 
in order to avoid labor law. They have created and 
helped to spread the “new ways of work” speech, as 
part of a new offensive regarding flexible ways of 
hiring workers. It is a strategy: avoiding to be seen 
as an employer is one of the main strategies of capi-
tal to manage labor in contemporary capitalism.
For the workers, it is harder to build identities 
and engage in collective actions. For the companies 
it helps to cut costs (avoiding labor rights, using 
flexible management etc.), to increase productivity 
(workers tend to be more dedicated, strikes are less 
likely to occur etc.) and even to increase subsump-
tion of labor, since often the workers do not even 
recognize themselves as part of the production.
However, the new farewell to work has also 
influenced the role of state regulation, removing 
wage workers from the protection of labor law once 
they are not classed as employees. As scholars and 
institutions reproduce this idea of wage employ-
ment decline, they help to legitimize and make the 
deficit of regulation seem inevitable. 
Wage employment does not seem to be declin-
ing, but its regulation depends entirely on the po-
litical struggle to regulate it. A fair discussion over 
the so-called new forms of work needs to rely on 
two main premises:
1. We must not take for granted the names com-
panies state in contracts, or assume they define 
the actual relationship. Depending on the con-
text, companies can attribute any terminology, 
and impose any condition to the contract, in-
cluding the way activities must be performed, 
to favor their interests. 
2. We must not confound the way in which the 
state regulates labor (which has been strongly 
influenced by the interests of companies) with 
the content of the phenomenon. 
To summarize, we do not entirely refuse the 
content of the literature debated here. A portion 
of workers may deny their identity as wage work-
ers and incorporate a business mentality, as if they 
were “capitalists of themselves”. Due to the new 
strategies of companies, which have the denial of 
wage employment as a central aspect of manage-
ment, the building of collective identity by work-
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ers becomes more difficult. It is not an incorrect 
perception of the literature, but an output of a long 
struggle over values and ideologies. Nevertheless, 
this picture is not enough to invalidate the possi-
bilities of reinforcing protective regulation of labor.
Final notes
During the last decades, while the working 
class has weakened, capital has organized a frame-
work of management that tends to reproduce and 
reinforce this weakness. It is ironic that in a context 
of a massive offensive of capital and increasing sub-
sumption of labor, we are witnessing a new farewell 
to the working class.
The new farewell to the working class states 
(even if it does not support) the disappearance of 
protective labor regulation as inevitable, claiming 
that labor rights for “new” forms of work are inap-
plicable or impossible. Workers would be autono-
mous, entrepreneurs or a precariat without ties to a 
specific entity that would be liable for their rights. 
By assuming the inexorable trend of this process, 
both the old and the new farewell share a very 
problematic political outcome, according to which 
workers protected by the law are part of privileged 
groups. This understanding obscures the exploita-
tion of labor and the real employers who benefit 
from the absence of legal obligation.
In Brazil, protective labor regulation has expe-
rienced a significant loss with the so-called Labor 
Reform (2017). Among hundreds of new rules that 
suppressed labor rights, the Labor Reform intro-
duced a new article widening the concept of self-
employment (that may work for a single company 
with exclusivity), therefore, seeking to reduce the 
scope of workers suitable to labor law protection. 
For instance, “self-employed” drivers of cars and 
trucks grew 25.4% between the third semester of 
2017 and the third semester of 2018 (PNAD).
There are signs of resistance among workers and 
institutions, as shown by decisions from Labor Courts 
in the UK and Brazil11 stating that UBER drivers are 
not self-employed, and inspections from the former 
Brazilian Ministry of Labor which concluded that 
couriers are employees of logistics companies12. Nev-
ertheless, the number of formal car drivers hired as 
employees in Brazil decreased over 25% after 2015, 
when UBER started to operate in the country. 17,530 
drivers were dismissed after the Labor Reform up 
to February 2019, while total formal employment 
(whole labor market) has experienced a small increase.
A struggle over labor regulation is occurring. 
It is not a natural dynamic arising from economic 
factors or any technical order. UBER is a good ex-
ample again. The underlying technology that al-
lows the operation of the app already existed long 
before the company. What did not exist was the 
legal permission to gather personal data and pro-
mote transportation services without the legal hir-
ing of workers. The “innovation” that matters here 
is mainly legal, resolved by politicians and lawyers, 
and not technological.
 Despite the extremely unfavorable context to 
the protective regulation of labor, the outcome of 
this process is not inexorable. An essential part of 
the resistance against the flexible/precarious forms 
of hiring a workforce lies in a shift in the uncritical 
assimilation of business narrative, which needs to 
be critically rethought in regards to the arguments 
and designations about the organization of produc-
tion and labor in current capitalism.
Notes
1 Of course, we assume that “capital strategies” mean a 
sort of complex historical-social process that includes 
how different wage-earning groups create and recre-
ate forms of resistance, conflict and adaptation. Here, 
by focusing as indicated on how these strategies are 
formulated, the purpose is precisely to evaluate how 
these logics and practices affect the modalities of 
workers’ struggle.
2 We are aware that the debate on social classes is broad-
er than this and wage workers are marked by cleav-
ages that lead, for instance, to the discussion about 
the difference between the working class (understood 
through the traditional concept of the proletariat) and 
the middle class (Cavalcante, 2012). However, the ar-
guments presented here on the dynamics of the labor 
markets are located at a level of the problem that does 
not require such a discussion on the internal divisions 
of wage earners.
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3 See, for instance, Grozelier (1998), Bidet,Texier 
(1994), Silva; Rodrigues (2006).
4 Translations done by the authors.
5 The data used here were collected from our research 
done in 2015. As there are thousands of building 
sites in the country, we decided to analyze a broader 
sample of sites rather than the small number that 
are usually chosen in this kind of study. Thus, we 
defined a sample of 105 building sites in six different 
cities of the UK. To make the sample more represen-
tative, we chose some of the main cities in the UK, 
including the capitals of England, Wales and Scot-
land. By doing so, we were more likely to cover cities 
with a higher number of building sites. The cities 
were: London, Edinburgh, Cardiff, Leeds, Liverpool 
and Manchester. In each building site, we sought to 
analyze 17 variables of safe working conditions and 
five additional data about the employer and site in-
formation. In London, we tried to cover an area of 
the city as wide as possible. We also attempted to vis-
it the building sites as many times as possible, check-
ing the various stages of construction. Our method 
to cover different areas of the city without using the 
same criterion was to start from the tube stations. In 
each location, we selected the two first building sites 
nearest to the tube station. From April to December 
2015, we inspected 74 building sites in 5 different 
zones of the city. We analyzed sites in south, east, 
west and north London.
6 This is also part of the research done in 2015, which 
included meetings and interviews with many agents 
engaged in the British labor market. Among them 
were managers, engineers, workers, unionists, activ-
ists and inspectors that enforce labor law in the UK. 
These moments were valuable in learning about the 
context on which is built the daily British world of 
work. They also helped in finding sources to think 
about and build indicators for the working conditions 
in the UK. We were able to hear different points of 
view, including those of workers, employers, manag-
ers, unionists and civil servants. Listening to the im-
pressions, problems, perspectives and challenges expe-
rienced by them was a key factor to better understand 
and problematize the sources and data used here.
7 “The couriers are considered self-employed contrac-
tors despite working for one firm for about 50 hours 
a week. The often-long working day of a London 
courier involves weaving through the city’s crowded 
and congested streets in the saddle covering 60 to 70 
miles, to be paid normally between £2 and £3 per 
delivery, depending on distance” (BBC, 2016)
8 In one of the cases involving chicken catching in west-
ern Bahia, in 2013, the company stated that it “vehe-
mently rejects any form of work and can be assimi-
lated to the condition analogous to slavery” and that 
“the inspection was not carried out at Granja da Mau-
ricea but in the property of an Integrated worker, a 





10 Information obtained during interviews with UBER 
drivers are available online in Brazil: http://www.par-
ceirosbr.com/politicas-e-regras/
11 See Process nº 1000123-89.2017.5.02.0038.
12 See AUTO DE INFRAÇÃO Nº 21.359.221-5
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O QUE MUDOU: UM 
NOVO ADEUS À CLASSE 
TRABALHADORA?
Vitor Araújo Filgueiras e Sávio Machado 
Cavalcante
Palavras-chave: Regulação do trabalho; 
Trabalho assalariado; Relações de trabalho.
Este artigo problematiza a tese desen-
volvida por diversos acadêmicos e insti-
tuições segundo os quais as sociedades 
capitalistas passaram por uma mudança 
drástica na natureza das relações de tra-
balho. Assume-se que mudanças sociais 
e econômicas no gerenciamento de tra-
balho e novas tecnologias teriam dis-
solvido formas tradicionais de emprego 
e a consequência seria um declínio do 
trabalho assalariado. Este “novo adeus 
à classe trabalhadora” contribui para a 
ideia que é impossível proteger traba-
lhadores através de regulações públicas. 
Baseado em pesquisas empíricas, usando 
diversos estudos de caso e dados de mer-
cados de trabalho no Brasil e no Reino 
Unido, nós argumentamos que “novas” 
formas de trabalho são predominante-
mente trabalho assalariado, a despeito 
dos esforços das empresas em disfarçar o 
conteúdo das relações de trabalho. Não 
negamos o surgimento de mudanças na 
gestão do trabalho pelas empresas, mas 
ressaltamos que isso inclui estratégias de 
dissimulação da relação salarial para re-
duzir as chances de limitar a exploração 
do trabalho.
WHAT HAS CHANGED: A NEW 
FAREWELL TO THE WORKING 
CLASS?
Vitor Araújo Filgueiras and Sávio 
Machado Cavalcante
Keywords: Work regulation; Wage labor; 
Work relationships.
This paper aims to discuss the thesis sup-
ported by several scholars and institu-
tions according to which capitalist soci-
eties have been through a sharp shift in 
the nature of work relations. It assumes 
that social and economic changes in 
work management and new technologies 
would have dissolved traditional forms 
of employment, and the consequence 
would be a decline in wage labor. This 
new ‘fare well to the working class’ con-
tributes to the idea that it is impossible 
to protect workers via public regulation.
Based on empirical research using sev-
eral case studies and data, especially from 
labor markets in Brazil and the United 
Kingdom, we argue that the “new” forms 
of work are predominantly wage labor, 
despite companies’ efforts to disguise the 
content of employment relations. We 
do not deny the emergence of changes 
in la bor management by companies. 
However, we point out that this includes 
strategies of dissimulation of the wage re-
lationship to reduce chances of limiting 
labor exploita tion.
QU’EST-CE QUI A CHANGE : UN 
NOUVEL ADIEU A LA CLASSE 
OUVRIERE ?
Vitor Araújo Filgueiras et Sávio 
Machado Cavalcante
Mots-clés: Régulation du travail; Travail 
salarié; Relation du travail.
Certains chercheurs et institutions 
pensent que les sociétés capitalistes ont 
connu un changement drastique au ni-
veau de la nature des relations de travail. 
Les changements socio-économiques 
de la gestion du travail et les nouvelles 
technologies auraient ainsi dissous les 
formes d’emploi traditionnelles et en-
traîné un déclin du travail salarié. Ce « 
nouvel adieu à la classe ouvrière » laisse 
entendre qu’il est impossible de protéger 
les travailleurs à travers des régulations 
publiques. À partir de recherches em-
piriques, d’études de cas et de données 
sur les marchés de travail du Brésil et du 
Royaume-Uni, l’objectif de ce texte est 
de montrer que les « nouvelles » formes 
de travail sont essentiellement de l’ordre 
du travail salarié, et ce, en dépit des ef-
forts des entreprises pour cacher le conte-
nu des relations de travail. Si l’appari-
tion de changements dans la gestion du 
travail par les entreprises se vérifie, nous 
pensons que cela inclut des stratégies de 
dissimulation de la relation salariale pour 
réduire les chances de limiter l’exploita-
tion du travail.
